Tuesday, March 29, 2011
Logistics Does Not End At The Dock
Sunday, September 12, 2010
Increased competition in International Parcels
Eastern Connection is a regional parcel carrier, that offers next day ground delivery service from Maine to Northern Virginia at rates that they state are 15 to 25% below that of UPS and FedEx. Eastern Connection's service area is ideal for companies with the need to distribute parcels from distribution centers in central Pennsylvania to customers throughout the Northeast.
TNT's international service connects to Eastern Connection's ground and priority networks through Eastern Connection's hub near Newark New Jersey. Eastern Connection can easily transport shipments for flights to TNT's European hubs via Newark as well as deliver TNT shipments with its service area.
Regional distribution of parcel shipments is growing as internationally sourced goods are transported by air or a combination of ship and rail to distribution points near the ultimate destination and then transported to the ultimate destination by a parcel carrier. While UPS and FedEx Ground can and do serve these customers, regional carriers working directly with shippers or with companies like TNT Express and non-asset based transportation companies, such as Expediters International, can provide the last 100 mile service at competitive rates and service levels.
TNT Express's alliance with Eastern Connection makes sense for both companies. For TNT, the alliance gives it access to an already established, profitable carrier to sell international services and pick-up international parcels throughout the Northeast without having to make a significant investment to create the transportation network or develop a customer base for regional shipping. To the extent that TNT Express uses Eastern Connection to deliver parcels in its service area, it provides it with a single contractor to deliver parcels throughout a 12 state region, allowing it to offer faster and lower cost delivery in the northeast than it had previously.
For Eastern Connection, the alliance gives it the opportunity to add volume throughout its system and a broader product mix that makes it more competitive for customers shipping both regionally and internationally. To the extent that TNT Express uses Eastern Connection's delivery network, Eastern Connection improves its scale economies without having to make investments in a sales force outside of the northeast.
Eastern Connection is not the only regional carrier that could improve the US service that TNT Express offers. If the alliance with Eastern Connection works well, then announcements may soon come linking TNT Express with other regional carriers as well. Then TNT will be faced with the question as to whether it wants to move beyond an alliance with a regional carrier to making the regional carriers a part of TNT's Express global network.
Monday, December 28, 2009
Postal Service as Editorial Fodder
Readers of this blog are more familiar with the problems that the Postal Service faces these writers. They will have no problems identifying how the writers of the two pieces illustrated their minimal knowledge of the postal market or the USPS.
Common to both pieces is a misunderstanding of how limited the competition between the Postal Service and United Parcel Service and FedEx really is. The Postal Service is in the business of delivering documents, small parcels (those under 10 pounds) shipped by all senders, and larger parcels shipped by households and others that ship parcels infrequently. FedEx and UPS focus on business-to-business shipments and household deliveries of larger parcels. FedEx and UPS use the Postal Service to deliver small parcels to households as the revenue generated to drop one small parcel at a household is not equal to the cost of delivery for those two carriers. More of the Postal Service's volumes compete with newspapers like The Los Angeles Times and Washington Times, than with UPS and FedEx.
So why does what is printed now in two newspapers matter to postal stakeholders? They are important because they provide some hint as to what the debate over the future business models will look like. Right now, postal policy is most likely a low level priority of both the Obama Administration and Congress. Postal Policy is not a hot button issue in the blogosphere, talk radio, cable news except when used to illustrate why the financial health of the Postal Service suggests that public option is a bad idea.
This will change when the Government Accounting Office issues its report on potential business models in March or April of 2010 and the issue of postal operating losses and retiree healthcare payment schedules raise the threat of default on payroll next fall, and the risk that debt limit will be hit in 2011. Postal policy will bubble to the top of public discourse in the spring and summer of 2010 because the blogosphere, talk radio, and infotainment programs on the cable news networks will see postal policy as an issue that their readers and listeners can easily understand, or more importantly understand an ideological position relative to future postal business models.
The rise of postal policy in public discourse will be helped by the fact that the "hot button" issues of 2009 will have mostly be dealt with. This includes health care, financial industry reforms, and possibly even energy policy and global warning. At that time, there will be few other "hot button" issues on the plate of Congress that the blogosphere, talk radio, cable news can talk about that every reader, listener, or viewer will easily understand and writers, hosts, or panelists can easily frame the problems of the Postal Service around their ideological perspective.
The Washington Times editorial uses the Postal Service to present a polemic against government provided services. It links together a series of anecdotal stories about poor customer service at retail outlets and the inability of the Postal Service to meet its Priority Mail commitment with references to news stories illustrating evidence that its operating process are breaking down. In conclusion, the Washington Times does not present solution, instead it concludes with a remark suggesting that households abandon the Postal Service for parcel delivery.
The Los Angeles Times piece (reprinted in the Allentown Morning Call) is more thoughtfully written but David Lazarus but illustrates the types of conclusions that are drawn when based on misinformation provided by the Postal Service employees who have a real interest in maintaining the status quo, limited understanding of customers of and competition within the document and parcel delivery markets that results, and limited time to assess the information collected in interviews.
The remainder of this post reflects comments that I sent to Mr. Lazarus and represent my initial reaction to a number of the points that he raised.
The question of privatization is often tied to the question of the monopoly. A privatized Postal Service does not require eliminating the monopoly. Examples of privately owned, legal monopolies exist among regulated utilities serving large territories and unregulated rural retail monopolies selling everything from gasoline to groceries.
"The postal service is asking for a national dialogue on this," Richard Maher, a Postal Service spokesman in Los Angeles said. "What is our role going to be in the future? We need to have a conversation about that."
The dialogue was mandated by Congress and GAO will have a report on the subject that the USPS is trying to influence at the end of March. They wrote a paper on the topic and hired 4 independent thinkers, including myself to look at the question. For more information go to www.postaljournal.com for links to all papers an links to presentations made on the topic at a recent conference in DC.
Who wants the take over the Postal Service's business?
The interviews with FedEx and UPS are reflective of their view. They do not want to get in the “mail” business because it is not a growth business like parcel shipping in Asia. They are being a little disingenuous as FedEx is the USPS’s largest transportation supplier. UPS is a significant supplier. Both use the USPS to deliver parcels under 5 pounds to households and to addresses that FedEx and UPS call “remote” For them, remote means many zip codes in outer suburbs of big cities. They also like having a competitor who is undercapitalized and a bit inefficient as it allows them to charge more for services in the US and use those profits to invest in faster growing markets abroad. They will be major players in policy debate to come.
If not UPS or FedEx who?
The only other US private sector firm who would be a logical buyer would be Pitney Bowes but the USPS might be too big for them to swallow. Similar problems would exist for foreign buyers, including Canada Post, Deutsche Post, and TNT Post Group. Buying the USPS, especially given its current financial position, business model, and restrictions on operations, customer relationships, etc would be not viewed as a viable proposition. Also, these companies, as well as UPS and FedEx have better uses of capital than in investing in the USPS. TNT has specifically indicated it is exiting the mail business outside of the Netherlands.
The big private shippers probably would be happy to cherry-pick profitable urban routes but would want nothing to do with having to schlep mail up and down unprofitable rural roads.
FedEx and UPS already do that with their pricing structure. The private carriers (they are carriers and not shippers; those that send stuff are shippers) have substantial surcharges on home delivery and “remote” delivery, and retail services, (e.g. anyone who does not have a corporate account) All of these surcharges makes the USPS cheaper for individual shippers of parcels and commercial shippers of light weight parcels to homes and remote areas. So they already cherry pick in the parcel business. There is some indication in Europe that entry into the mail delivery market even into the most high-volume high-income neighborhoods is difficult to do profitably Furthermore not all urban carrier routes are profitable as routes in low income urban neighborhoods have much less mail per stop than those in high income neighborhoods and "cream skimmers" may find that the number of routes that could be served profitably are too few to justify investment in a start-up delivery business.
It seems to me that the only privatization scheme that stands even a remote chance of working would be to break the postal service network into hundreds of regions and territories, and then have local companies compete for mail-delivery rights in each area. But you'd still have to wonder how any such private-sector players would be more successful at the game than a long-established heavyweight like the Postal Service.
Breaking up the Postal Service has been suggested before. The problem with this solution is that almost all buyers of mail service want the company that collects / accepts the mail to have the ability to seamlessly deliver to any address in the US. Mailers, and in particular larger mailers, want to maximize their purchasing leverage by buying from one or two transportation sources not 50. That is why both FedEx and UPS have national parcel, express and freight networks and ATT, Sprint, T-mobile, and Verizon all offer nationwide wireless service. The privatization scheme that would have the best chance of working would be an IPO with a significant employee ownership. It could come only after the USPS could show it could operate profitably under private sector business and employment law. This is what happened with Conrail in the 1980’s.
"If the system was privatized, it might cost 44 cents to get a letter across Los Angeles but $5 to get it to Connecticut," said Richard Maher, the postal service spokesman. "When you think about a network that delivers to all homes every day -- it's huge," he said. "Would a private company be able to do that? I don't think so. I think we would lose universal service."
These are canards. Every country uses a uniform rate for single-piece mail and in many cases for Parcels. (look at the rate structure for parcel in Germany where you can send a parcel anyplace in the world and only have to choose among some 20 or so rates based on the size of the box and the destination country.) Business mailers (LL Bean, Bank of America, etc, may see rates that are not uniform. In fact, those advertising mailers that drop their mail at local post offices rather than anyplace in the country already have the distance based rates that Mr. Maher says would be so terrible. If distance based rates are introduced to First Class for commercial mailers, percentage differences between local and distant rate will likely be much less than 100% rather than the 1,136% that the Postal Service spokesman describes.
The percentage difference between local parcels and those shipped cross-country vary with weight. The percentage does not exceed 100% until the parcel exceeds 17 pounds. This suggests that the impact of transportation on rates for items that are sorted at origin and destination would be quite small.
The Universal Service Obligation (USO) argument has been gone over many times. The driver of the USO is commercial mailers, who must mail to every possible address. The rates charged these mailers can be set to cover the total cost of delivering to every address printed on their mail using either a uniform or distance-based rate. The acceptance of remote surcharges by customers or FedEx and UPS illustrate that private sector carriers can devise non-uniform rates that allow them to deliver to all addresses in all 50 states. UPS and FedEx have a common carrier obligation which creates a common law requirement to actually deliver to all points that they say they reach according to advertised service commitments. Similar obligations exist for other trucking, rail, air and telecommunication carriers and are enforced by regulators and courts. In addition, there are lots of publicly traded utilities that provide “universal service” as it is within their charter to offer the service to every potential customer. With a common carrier obligation, the only financial problem for the Postal Service would be developing rates that cover the costs of single-piece mail sent or received by single piece mailers in the nation's most rural areas as defined by the Department of Agriculture.
Moreover, why limit the system's network of post offices to stamps and boxes? Why not have the post office deal in all manner of communications, from book and cell phone sales to DVD rentals? Heck, why not sofas, lattes and Wi-Fi access?
I agree with you that the USPS should be able to do more beyond what it does now. I also believe that just as private health insurers did not want a public option to compete with them, Starbucks, ATT, Amazon, Banes and Nobel, Citibank, and all kinds of other firms in the private sector do not want a government entity competing with them. In the United States we do not have a tradition of having a government entity actively competing with the private sector. Also the employment laws and business laws that apply to the government do not work really well for an entity like the USPS that gets 70% of its revenue now from customers that mail more than 500 pieces at a time. If the Postal Service must expand outside traditional mail business, then the only choice is a corporate private-sector model for the Postal Service.
This brief post illustrates the massive education effort that lies ahead for stakeholders in the mail industry. Editorial writers and business journalists have influence far beyond the few people who buy their papers and contacting them individually or in groups will be critical for stakeholders. But stakeholders can not stop there as the primary source of news and opinion on the future of mail will come from the web, talk radio and cable news. The tea-party movement shows how the internet, talk radio and cable news could drive and amplify a public policy issue that every voter uses, has a personal connection to, and can develop a vision for its future based on their political ideology and personal interests. With the Government Accounting Office report coming out this spring, it is time for stakeholders to begin this effort. Without it, Congressional reaction to the report will be driven by influences whose livelihoods and businesses do not depend on the future of mail.
Sunday, December 6, 2009
Amazon: Avoiding the Post Office
According to the article, Amazon is not looking to open retail outlets where customers can buy goods that the store has in inventory. Instead, the stores will provide a delivery point for customers that order larger items that mail or truck delivery is inconvenient.
[Monday 12/7/2009 Amazon has subsequently denied the story. Given the success of Apple stores and Amazon's success in revolutionizing the retail supply chain, the idea that Amazon would add a brick and mortar option seems logical. The brick and mortar option clearly fits with Amazon's clear interest in reducing the time from order to delivery. The post was edited following its original posting to reflect why Amazon may have explored the possibility of retail even if it has for now rejected the available brick and mortar options.]
Amazon's move if completed would put it in direct competition with Argos, Tesco and John Lewis which all offer similar services. The Times reports that Argos' customers pick-up 18% of their Internet purchases in brick and mortar outlets rather than have the items delivered by parcel carrier or road transport. Argos will generate half of their television sales this Christmas via the combination of a purchase on the Internet and delivery to a brick and mortar outlet.
If Amazon goes ahead with a retail strategy, it should be able to haul items for pick-up to its "stores" using contract carriers dedicated to their retail network. Amazon's business case would most likely show that both customers prefer to pick-up their larger items at a retail outlet and the overall delivery costs, including the cost of operating retail outlets, is less than the cost of home delivery. Amazon could then decide to hold some inventory of fast moving items at retail outlets to further reduce costs and allow for same day pick-up of these items. For this strategy to be successful, the customer's experience in retail outlets has to be just as good as the experience on the website.
A retail initiative by Amazon's would be a direct assault on Royal Mail, DHL, UPS, TNT, FedEx and road transport companies that handle items that weigh over 75 pounds (34 kilo). The reported new initiative would also be a direct assault on retail outlets of Royal Mail and its competitors that could provide a similar service to replace the loss of sales as single-piece letter mail volume decline.
Amazon is unlikely to pursue a similar strategy in the United States. Pursuing this strategy in the United States could require Amazon to collect sales taxes on sales in those states where it opened retail outlets. Losing the sales tax advantage would eliminate a price advantage that Amazon has over Best Buy, Sears and other s that offer store pick-up of Internet sales. Given the peculiarity of U.S. tax law there is an opportunity for FedEx, UPS, and the Postal Service to work with Amazon to expand the hours of a limited set of their retail outlets to make them pick-up points for Amazon and other Internet retailers. Alternatives any of these competitors could follow the lead of the German and Danish Post Offices and open self-service lock-boxes for after hours parcel delivery.
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
Job Cuts or Wage Cuts (2)
Immediately, 5,000 postal employees or around 22% of all postal employees will be laid off. An additional 6,000 jobs will be eliminated with retirements, not renewing temporary contracts, and not filling vacancies. When the process is over TNT will have little more than half of the employees the have today.
TNT has an advantage over the USPS as it can afford the severance, early retirement incentives, and unemployment expenses associated with the layoffs. Also TNT does not have to deal with RIF rules that make determining who is left aft a layoff a real challenge for management.
While the Postal Service may not have to drop employees by half, further reductions beyond what attrition produces appears inevitable over the lives of new postal union contracts. Developing methods to make the reductions as painless as possible for employees and management would seem to be an area that will come up in the current negotiations.
Monday, November 9, 2009
Job Cuts or Wage Cuts
Prior to the agreement TNT had placed on the table the possibility of laying off 11,000 employees. This proposal was made after the Union had rejected a 15% pay cut in March, 2009.
The driver behind the contentious negotiations is the rapid drop in mail volumes at TNT. TNT like all postal operators have been hurt by both a severe recession and declining demand due to electronic competition.
TNT's contract may present a framework for upcoming negotiations that the United States Postal Service have with their unions. The Postal Service faces similar economic and competitive challenges to what drove TNT to offer sizable pay cuts, threaten massive layoffs and eventually agree to modest layoffs and small cuts in pay.
The Postal Service differs in that it has not previously made as extensive an effort to streamline and optimize its network and has less flexibility in the use of full-time and part-time employees. Therefore it enters the upcoming round of labor negotiations needing significantly more contract changes that what TNT was willing to accept. Without binding arbitration, the US postal unions and the Postal Service, just like TNT and its unions, would have to make the choice between cutting jobs and cutting real compensation levels.
With binding arbitration, the outcome is less certain. However, given the difficulty of selling eliminating long-standing contract provisions to their members, postal unions and the Postal Service are likely heading toward an arbitrated contract agreement where an arbitrator will be asked to make the choice between jobs and compensation.
Tuesday, October 13, 2009
The Courier, Express, and Postal Business and the Nobel Prize
So what does that mean in plain English? More importantly, why am I writing about this award in a blog dedicated to the courier, express, and postal industry?
Simply, operators in this business have a choice as they try to provide service across a broad geographic area or across the range of transportation and communications needs of their customers within a firm rather than through contractual arrangements between regional or modal partners. With few exceptions, when faced with the choice of providing service with a partner through a contract or within the constructs of a corporate structure, operators in this business have chosen corporate structures. The expansions of Deutsche Post, FedEx, TNT, and United Parcel Service all followed this path.
These firms succeeded by out-competing national postal operators that had to offer international service through bi-lateral or multi-national contractual arrangements, many of which were negotiated through the Universal Postal Union. The key problem of these contractual arrangements were that the operator selling the international service could not truly tell the buyer how long it would take to get delivery because they could not control the end-to-end service. Nor could the originating operator offer a seamless track-and-trace service until many years after the global corporate operators had made them a requirement of international express and parcel delivery.
The choice of a corporate model reflects a choice on a less global scale as well. Efforts by La Poste (France) and Royal Mail to provide service throughout Europe illustrate attempts to create a corporate structure within the Europe for parcel delivery to replace the contractual service that involved each national postal operators. The Austrian Post has purchased a number of firms focused in Eastern Europe with a goal of creating a stronger regional delivery competitor. The recent decision to merge the post offices in Sweden and Denmark also illustrates the choice of a corporate rather than a contract model to provide service within the CEP markets that the two independent posts now operate. Finally, Purolator Courier, a Canada Post subsidiary, and Canada Post itself, have established a strong corporate presence to handle cross-border traffic. Purolator is using its presence in the cross-border market to begin a domestic United States service.
Now there are limits to the use of a corporate model in the CEP industry. Firms in the industry use both a corporate and contractual or franchise model to provide retail services. The cost of maintaining a stand-alone retail infrastructure that has different business challenges than the rest of the CEP business has driven many firms to switch from the corporate to the contract model for this part of the business.
The last area that may fall under the contract model is the pick-up and delivery services themselves. Here the question is whether it is better to manage the delivery process with employees or contractors. The local courier business has always used a contractor model reflecting the uncertainty of the traditional on-demand unscheduled delivery service that they offered. FedEx Ground has used that model since its founding as Roadway Package Express. The recent court cases, IRS rulings, and NLRB rulings illustrate the challenge of maintaining the delivery function as a contractual arrangement and still maintaining proper control over the delivery portion of the service. However, both FedEx and local couriers believe that the cost advantages of managing delivery with contract drivers rather than employees is worth creating the proper legal structures to both ensure a reasonable level of control while still maintaining the driver's contractor status.
The question of corporate vs. contract models will likely come up as Congress looks at potential business models for the Postal Service. The work of Oliver Williams suggests that use of contract model could work for the retail side of the business where a franchiser that does not live up to its end of the bargain could be replaced. His work also suggests that delivery contractors could work in those areas where control over the appearance and schedule of the deliverer was not an issue. This is precisely what the Postal Service does with box-route contractors that serve many rural areas.
More importantly, his work explains why breaking the Postal Service into regional franchises or separating the delivery from processing and collection processes make little sense. Once the separation occurred the various parts would still have to contract with each other to provide end-to-end service. There is no competitive market for large-scale sortation. The growth of UPS’s and FedEx’s use of Parcel Select suggests that the collection and sortation companies would still have to contract with a company running the existing delivery network. Mr. Williams research suggests that there would be significant coordination issues and contractual gamesmanship between the various parts of what is now a unified Postal Service. The experiences of Citi Mail in Sweden and TNT, DX and others in UK illustrate the preference of operators to offer end to end service and the coordination issues and contractual gamesmanship that exists in developing interline agreements when these firms have to contract with either a national postal operator or another independent operator. [One of the drivers behind mergers and territorial expansion of railroads and less-than-truckload trucking firms in the US was the failure of a regulated interline process to resolve contractual and service issues when one firm passedfreigt to the other]
Finally, his work suggests the mail business will see more consolidation and not less in the future. The current process in which multiple firms handle the process a taking a document from concept to delivery with each handoff handled via a contracted or regulated process, could soon involve fewer firms as the advantage of integrating more of these processes within a single firm becomes clear to firms on either ends of these processes merge.
Sunday, August 10, 2008
Consolidation of the Package Delivery Market in Europe
The Telegraph report provides significantly more detail than the earlier report on FedEx's interest in TNT. The report includes the names of the investment advisers for both TNT and UPS and indicates that A.T. Kearney has completed a study for UPS's adviser in the deal, Morgan Stanley. The report also indicates that TNT's mail operations would be sold, possibly to CVC, the European buyout firm that owns interests in both De Post-La Post and Post Danmark. (Post Danmark also has agreed to merge with Posten, the Swedish Post Office) It is unclear whether the price for the postal operations is included in the $15 billion cost of the deal. Given that some of the increase in TNT's price over its price in mid July when rumors of a possible takeover first surfaced reflect the decline in oil prices, it is possible that the value of a deal when consummated will be greater than $15 billion. Also, what is unclear is whether TNT's ground parcel business would convey to UPS or the purchaser of the postal business.
The purchase of TNT by UPS would have a significant impact on competition within Europe. Currently, the five largest express competitors are TNT (17%), DHL (16%), UPS (8%), La Poste (the French Post Office) 7%, and FedEx (6%). The remaining 46% of the market is divided the national post offices and regional operators. With the merger UPS would be the clear market leader with 25% of the intra-European market and would be in stronger position for traffic between Western Europe and the rest of the world than the remaining two other global competitors, DHL and FedEx. Most importantly, UPS would then be in a better position to fill up its growing capacity in China and the rest of Asia with express traffic going between China and Europe than carriers with a smaller market position in Europe. In addition, UPS's stronger position in Europe would give it the opportunity to take market share from DHL and FedEx in the trans-Atlantic market.
The sale of the postal operations makes sense given that mail is not part of UPS's core business.
The proposed sales of TNT's mail business raises questions about the long term financial viability of European national posts, and in particular the posts of smaller countries. A merger of the TNT mail operations with Posten (Sweden), La Post (Belgium), and Post Dankan (Denmark) creates an entity with greater heft when competing with the larger national posts in Germany, France, and Great Britain. If TNT's growing ground parcel business remains with the postal entitity then the merger would have created a significant European competitor in parcels with particular strengths in the Benelux and Nordic regions. Without TNT's European ground parcel business, it is not clear how much an outside investor would be willing to pay for just mail services.
The merger of TNT's mail services with that of the other posts could have some positive impact on service. It could result in improved coordination of cross-border mail service among the linked companies with the possibility of stronger service to Great Britain and other regions where TNT has established itself as a leader in the competitive mail business.
Finally, if this merger goes through, one would expect that other competitors in the European market to start looking at defensive moves to improve their business position. The easiest
linkage to imagine is one between FedEx and LaPoste, since they have had a business relationship since at least 2000, but less obvious mergers may occur with a focus of FedEx and/or La Poste working to strengthen their position on a country by country basis. On the mail and ground parcel side, one could see an interest in smaller posts in Eastern and central Europe exploring mergers and operating agreements. The logical leaders in this region are Deusche Post, Oesterreich Post, and Swiss Post.

