The Postal Service, President Obama, and the Budget

In the next sixty days, President Obama will have two opportunities to lay out administration policy regarding the Postal Service.  These opportunities are the State of the Union address and the President's budget for FY2011.

Up to now, President Obama has mentioned the Postal Service only to illustrate the fact that private firms can compete with a public health care plan last summer.   His comments suggested that the financial problems of the Postal Service were serious enough to generate the attention of the White House.

Unless there is some economic miracle, the Postal Service will have a negative impact on the Federal budget and budget deficit for at least the next three years.   The financial challenges of the Postal Service was not recognized in last year's budget and the adjustment to the retiree health care payments were made in such a way that budget scoring was not required prior to passage.  This year, the need for adjustments to the retiree health plan payments before the end of at least the next two fiscal years is known prior to the writing of the budget.  Therefore, the budget should recognize this fact.

The Postal Service's need for an adjustment to its retiree health payments forces the Obama administration to find cost reductions in other programs in order to meet budgetary goals, and in particular begin the wind down of the stimulus related spending.  This shift in priorities from spending to stimulate the economy to reducing the deficit will likely be the theme of the President's budget and a major theme of the State of the Union Address.


The Postal Service's negative budgetary impact should force the Obama administration to enter the debate about the future of the Postal Service in the budget documents submitted to Congress, and possibly as a mention in the State of the Union address  In particular, the President's budget should recognize that the Postal Service is in serious trouble and lay out both how far the administration is willing to go to help the Postal Service deal with its immediate financial troubles and how the administration wants to approach the process of finding a new business model and regulatory framework for the Postal Service to ensure that the Postal Service becomes truly self sufficient.   Now is the time for stakeholders who would like to see Presidential leadership in setting a future for the Postal Service, postal customers, and postal employees to ensure that this happens.

Congress and the Postal Service

The United States Postal Service is unique among publicly-owned postal operators in that no executive department has the "shareholder." responsibility for the enterprise.   By default, this responsibility has fallen on Congress.  Since the passage of the PRA, Congress has tended to downplay its shareholder role which has resulted in Congressional actions that undermine the competitiveness of the Postal Service and the value of the enterprise.

The problem with Congress reflects the inherent conflict between its interest in the Postal Service as shareholder and its institutional interest in reelection.   As such, the Postal Service has frequently become a tool to help balance the Federal Budget, with these actions constantly weakening the financial position of the Postal Service.   (See. USPS-OIG white paper, Federal Budget Treatment of the Postal Service)     Other actions reflect institutional interests in serving constituent groups that could be affected by postal business strategies, many times to the detriment of the enterprise.

The Postal Service has not helped its shareholder see these conflicts as its business strategy has been opaque to even many seasoned observers.   Its current strategy focusing on reducing costs by reducing retail locations and delivery days raise this question again.   As the observer, Rag Content notes:

The potential impact of changing operations is something the Postal Service seems to be doing without much thought to its customer base these days.  As it hides behind the line - matching resources to revenue, it continues to downsize its operations from closing post offices to reducing the remittance mail processing on Sundays in some locations to its AMP consolidation effort. The post office closing is the only docket open before the Postal Regulatory Commission at the moment, yet every change the Postal Service is making operationally affecting its ability to provide uniform service throughout the country.

A similar question is now being raised by shareholders by another troubled enterprise, General Electric.  General Electric, a diversified financial, manufacturing, and entertainment company, has gone through probably the worst year in the company's history.  The company had to take funds from TARP funds to shore up its financial unit and has sold nearly $10 billion in assets and slashed its dividend by two-thirds in order to improve its liquidity.

Now shareholders are looking for a clearer picture of how General Electric will earn a competitive return on investment dollars going forward.  A recent Bloomberg News story covering General Electrics upcoming December 15,2009 shareholders meeting illustrates how involved shareholders think about a company with an unclear business plan.

General Electric Co. Chief Executive Officer Jeffrey Immelt says a financial crisis like the one he faced this past year often demanded action first and explanations later. Later is now, investors say.

“People want them to do a better job explaining what the return hurdles are for the businesses going forward,” said Mark Demos, who helps manage $19.8 billion at Fifth Third Asset Management in Minneapolis. “GE has a mixed track record on putting capital to work over the past five years.”

The shareholder of the Postal Service needs to ask the same types of questions that the shareholders of General Electric are asking GE's management.

• What is your long-term strategy to ensure a commercially viable, and more importantly self sufficient enterprise?
• How do short-term cost cutting efforts affect that long-term strategy?
• What is the long-term business strategy that the changes identified in the Postal Service's business model paper support?
• Is that strategy financially viable and what risks could derail its viability?
• How much capital and cash is needed to execute that strategy?
• If existing capital and cash is not sufficient, what is your strategy to raise more capital?
• What are the risks to the shareholder and the existing holders of Postal Service debt and other unfunded obligations?
  

While these are questions that Congress, as shareholder should ask both now and on a regular basis in the future.   Given Congress's track record on taking their responsibility as shareholder as seriously as General Electric's shareholders do, it may make sense to explicitly give some other government entity that responsibility, especially if solving the current financial crisis will require the Postal Service, like General Electric to seek relief from either unfunded obligations or expansion of its borrowing capabilities. 

Postal Service and the Federal Budget

More than anything else, the greatest political obstacle to a new business model for the Postal Service is the Federal budget deficit. Every legislative action to maintain postal services in light of current financial losses, and fund the transition that will create a new business model will have budgetary implications. Thee budgetary implications will likely become the primary arguments of postal competitors and other opponents of reform for delaying necessary changes that would make the Postal Service a viable and customer-focused provider of delivery and delivery related services.

Currently, the Postal Service is seeking relief from the demand of the Office of Personnel Management as included in the Postal Reorganization and Enhancement Act (PAEA) for accelerated funding of retiree benefit. The accelerated payments had a positive budget impact that smoothed the passage of the PAEA. However, the accelerated payment schedule reflected three misconceptions about the Postal Service that made the accelerated schedule seem reasonable.

• First, demand trends for mail were sufficiently strong to generate the revenue necessary to cover the payments. Congress, like many governmental and business executives at the time assumed the rosiest scenario for the Postal market and in particular demand for advertising mail and the mail revenue that it generated. When the recession hit and the revenue disappeared, the Postal Service lost its ability to meet the new payment terms.
  
  
• Second, the Postal Service was sufficiently capitalized to continually modernize its distribution and retail networks to reduce costs and improve service. The Postal Service had aggressively reduced its debt through the good fortune of strong demand for advertising mail, improved management of operating costs, and parsimonious spending on capital projects. Congress did not have an independent assessment of the true capital and cash needs of the Postal Service, particularly as they related to the legislation demand for improved cost management and network realignment.
  
  
• Third, cutting operating costs does not require significant one-time expenses if they are to be done quickly in ways that are transparent to customers. Both Congress and the Postal Service assumed that it had the time to reduce its workforce and streamline its network through the nearly costless method of employee attrition and minimal capital spending to move postal operations to locations that better fit today's mail distribution patterns. With no funds to reduce the workforce, the Postal Service is limited to those streamlining efforts that can be accommodated through moving employees to new jobs within the network that will not require payment of moving expenses.
  
  Unfortunately, markets can and did change more rapidly than either historical attrition rates or the slower attrition rates caused by the sagging stock market and economy. Accelerating reductions in the workforce, including supervisors and management at all levels, requires either early retirement incentives or severance pay. With an average hourly wage ranging from $25.70 for bargaining unit employees to $42.10 for headquarters employees, these incentives or severance payments can be a significant challenge for a Postal Service with limited or no cash reserves and the need to reduce its workforce faster than what attrition will allow.
  
  Similarly, limited cash reserves restricts both planning for and funding capital projects that can improve the placement of postal facilities in an effort to both reduce costs and improve service. While no company managing an operating network would replace an operating network with a new green-field one, all well capitalized transportation companies know that a continuously improving network requires having sufficient capital to fund moving operations over time as demand, technology and distribution patterns shift.
  

Right now, the increasing visibility of deficit politics affects the viability of proposals designed to enable the Postal Service to survive the next two years. In requesting that the GAO complete its report on potential business models in April, the Senate appears to acknowledge that more needs to be done. Given the political calender, dealing with the misconceptions of the PAEA and the financial reality of funding the needed transformation that each alternative business model suggested by GAO would require could put the impact that proposed alternatives will have on the deficit right in the middle of the 2010 political debate. If that happens, developing a long-term solution that the Postal Service continues to meet the needs of its customers will be far more politically charged than any previous efforts at postal reform.